Value Clarity, High Morality
and the Catholic School Mission
By Delmer Wagner (Principal), St. Patrick School, Swift Current, SK
This article attempts to articulate which values are basic to Catholic education and how current research can help Catholic schools deliver these values. I also attempt to analyze the issue of indoctrination versus values clarification and show how critical thinking is as much a part of Catholic education as it is of secular education. As well, an examination of what research has to say regarding the teacher's role in values education will be undertaken. While recognizing that the social studies class is a fertile garden for teaching values, this article aims to present an integrated approach that applies to all subjects. An underlying premise of this article is that current research findings and Catholic educational philosophy need not contradict one another, and indeed can enhance and enrich one another, provided that the integrity of either is not comprised.
Value Clarity or High Morality?
While it many seem ironic, the central thesis of this article was inspired by a major proponent of vales clarification, Merrill Harmin, whose earlier works supported a relativistic form of values education I find contrary to the teaching of sound morality. The irony comes from the fact that this scholar, who formed part of the values clarification "debut" in the book Values and Teaching (Louis Raths, Merrill Harmin and Sidney Simon 1966), is the same person who in recent years has recanted some of his previously held beliefs. Harmin (1988, 25), in an eloquently written article for the prestigious journal Educational Leadership, effectively argues how it makes much more sense "to go for both" value clarity and high morality:
As I look back, it would have been better had we presented a more balanced picture, had we emphasized the importance of helping students both to clarify their own personal values and to adopt society's moral values. Indeed, combining value clarity and high morality, like combining process and content, is just plain smart.
"Going for both" is precisely the issue I explore in this article. However, I will also add a third dimension which considers the mandate of Catholic education. Catholic educators, along with all educators interested in improving the state of morality in the future, would do well to try to harmonize the best of all approaches dealing with the teaching of values. In advocating this eclectic approach, it is only fair that I pay due respect to Harmin, who has not only the professional integrity to back off from previously stated views, but also the foresight to present constructive suggestions for the future.
Perhaps the first step in bringing harmony between these seemingly opposing viewpoints is to recognize that extremist positions exist on both sides of the issue. The divisive potential of this issue has been unleashed by scholars such as Simon (1974), who titled one of his articles "Values-Clarification vs. Indoctrination". The damaging effect of such a title is that one is left with the impression that there is no room for the type of compromise proposed by Harmin.
To say that the debate on values clarification has been intense, and perhaps even "ugly" is an understatement. In some cases, researchers have gone so far as to attack people, rather than discuss the issues. Boyd (1984, 287) gives a good example of how proponents in this debate even resorted to name calling when he writes about the kinds of papers he has received from students who have attacked proponents of values clarification. One student took the names of Simon, Raths and Harmin and incorporated them into the title of his paper: "Simple Simon and the Grape of Rath's: What's the Harmin Values Clarification"? As one who does not consider himself an expert in the field of values education, I cannot help but be alarmed by those who would engage in such a low level of debate.
Simon (1974, 278), who sides with the approach known as "values clarification," writes: "None of us has the right set of values to pass on to other people's children". Conversely, Gairdner (1992, 225), in an examination of current social and educational policy, has hotly attacked values clarification as being one of the most detrimental influences that has occurred in this century, arguing that if values clarification is assumed by teachers to be a cure to fill "the moral vacuum left by a society of dying religions and failing families, the consequences of their assumptions suggest that the cure may be worse than the illness". As a Catholic educator, I cannot subscribe to any of the aforementioned approaches. A Catholic school philosophy cannot condone values clarification or indoctrination when the definition of each is narrow and extremist. A useful examination of these approaches cannot occur without first developing some standard definitions and understandings regarding values clarification and indoctrination. To me, much of the present controversy exists as a result of confused signals and misunderstandings that have occurred around these central issues of values education.
Indoctrination
In Catholic education, indoctrination does not have the same negative connotations it does for writers such as Simon (1974). Our tradition has essentially been one where we have passed on not only the faith, but also the doctrines that embellish and define our Catholic heritage. By definition, the passing on of doctrines involves indoctrination of kind that allows for not a forced, bur rather a free response and a respect for the autonomy of the learner. In this sense, indoctrination involves not only didactic teaching, exposure to tradition and heritage, but also admonition, correction and learning by experience. Homilies and inspirational talks might be considered a form of indoctrination, even when based on a respect for human freedom. However, in the eyes of the church, they are considered an acceptable and essential part of Christian experience. As well, the church has long recognized the importance of the shared word not only to the religious life of the people, but also to their moral conduct.
The good example of, or effective modeling by significantly important persons in the life of the observer is also indoctrination, although indirectly so. As Traviss (1985, 3) states: "Psychologists and educators…have been decrying the absence of heroes and heroines in the lives of young people, and researchers report narcissistic self-absorption that is having negative effects on the mental health of the young".
By definition, the reading of biography, which causes young people to admire the lives of worthy and exemplary people, is a form of indoctrination. However, this has not stopped well known educators such as Thomas Lickona (1983) from providing lists of "Books for Kids That Foster Moral Values". Similarly, it did not stop Audrey T. Edwards in 1975 from presenting a paper to the International Reading Association, titled "Selecting Books to Promote Moral Development". Nor did it prevent the writers of the new Saskatchewan language arts curriculum from including a unit titled "Heroes and Heroines". From a Catholic perspective, indoctrination, when interpreted as teaching children about certain religious or widely accepted societal norms, is an important part of values education.
We should also pay heed to the writings of Joseph Kirman (1991, 32-33), who held the position of chairperson of the National Council for the Social Studies. Kirman is one of a handful of scholars who has tried to dispel some of the negativism associated with this controversial term:
There is continual indoctrination going on in every elementary school classroom in the world. The behavioral expectations within schools are themselves elements of indoctrination, as are the actions of the teachers and others who are representatives of the adult world….The term indoctrination has negative implications only when the child is prohibited from questioning the teacher and must uncritically accept the value, or when the value cannot honestly be defended by the teacher. Many of us feel that indoctrination is contrary to valuing strategies that allow the child to find personal solutions to problems. But responsible teachers try to instill in children socially acceptable actions regarding a system of values. Many children don't know what is right in or accepted by society. Is there an intellectually defensible argument …for the techniques of indoctrination? Within certain limits, such an argument does exist. Giving a specific set of values to young children may provide them with a reasonable set of standards for judging other value items within their society.
For many, indoctrination is rejected as an intrusion of external and coercive authoritarianism on the part of the teacher. It is further dismissed by the developmentalists because it is seen as socialization, devoid of reasoning and critical thinking on the part of the student. The work of Raths (1969) and Simon (1974) has resulted in indoctrination being perceived as a pejorative term that modern teachers shy away from, and rightly so, if by indoctrination they mean conditioning or force or the avoidance of reasoning. One of the best counter-arguments to this ill-conceived notion of indoctrination can be found in Hull (1984, 198-205):
In the New Testament, especially the Epistles, the Christian finds numerous exhortations to achieve an alert, watchful, vigilant, inquiring, and discriminating spirit. The Christian view of man is that like the educational view, he is unfinished….Christian anthropology, therefore, goes hand in hand with a developmental view of human personhood. As for authority vs. freedom, we must distinguish between two concepts of authority; the authoritarian and the authoritative. The authoritarian person contains no criteria: he is right because he says so. The authoritative person, on the other hand, has his authority because of specific reasons, gives specific criteria based on research or the quality of arguments. Catholics believe that God's authority is authoritative. He and His Church do no like frustrated parents, shout, "Do as you're told!"…Lastly, the highest realms to which we are called in Christian spirituality do not call for the mere passive obedience of easily-led sheep….Christ call us to be disciples, learners…constantly challenged by Christ's question to the apostles, "What do you think?" We are to have a spirit of critical openness - not the spirit of complacency that sometimes characterizes the academic, but the humble attitude of one who knows he has much to learn.
Hull's remarks do not suggest that the teacher abdicate authority. Clearly, there must be an adult in the classroom; but there is a vast difference between exercising the authority of a teacher and resorting to authoritarianism. A close examination of the early dictionary meanings of the term indoctrination indicates that its historical meanings were not as pejorative as they are today. Beck (1974), after doing a summary of current literature on indoctrination, found that there is fairly general agreement that indoctrination is a bad thing, but there is less agreement about what exactly makes it bad. Wilson (1964) suggested that indoctrination of a negative type only occurs if the "content" of what is being taught is false, mistaken or uncertain. There are others, however, such as Crittenden (1973) and Morris (1966) who maintain that indoctrination only takes place when people are not allowed to use their critical faculties.
While none of these scholars has captured the "essence" of indoctrination, one can conclude that elements of truth can be found in all positions. Sullivan (1975, 99) points out that the most important thing that can be learned is not necessarily to become hung up on the term indoctrination, but rather to be "on guard" of those things in education that would allow for "peddling false beliefs; adopting authoritarian intentions with respect to students; using methods that do not engage the free spirit and critical faculties of students; and producing in students a state of mindless acceptance of conventional attitudes and beliefs". These cautions need to be taken to heart and carefully considered by Catholic educators who need to seek an integrated approach that respects Catholic values and students' right to respond freely.
Values Clarification
Another theory dealing with values is "values clarification". This theory was developed and promulgated by scholars such as Raths (1969) and Simon (1974). According to these pioneers of values clarification, to tell a student that certain values are good would be nothing short of manipulation and coercion. Consequently, the methods are, for the most part, indirect and address only process. Through this process, teachers encourage students to reveal their values and then, through various strategies, assist students to clarify these values. The methods involve helping students ascertain which values they prize and cherish. Through this approach, students are encouraged to be less passive and to become responsible for their own choices. Students must freely choose their values after considering alternatives and are encouraged to act on their choices in a way that provides a public affirmation of their values. A summary of Raths' (1969) criteria for values clarification (cited in Hall 1973, 97) follows:
Choosing
1. Choosing freely
2. Choosing from alternatives
3. Choosing from alternatives after considering the consequences of each alternative
Prizing
4. Cherishing and being happy with the choice
5. [Being] willing to affirm the choice publicly
Acting
6. Actually doing something with a choice
7. Acting repeatedly in some pattern of life
It would seem that such a view of values clarification draws heavily from the philosophy of Rousseau: "All that I feel to be right, is right; whatever I feel to be wrong, is wrong". The sensitivity to pluralism that this theory attempts to address results in a moral relativism where there are no right or wrong answers anywhere, especially in matters of values and ethics. Thus the moral relativist who is consistent with this extremist view of values clarification cannot condemn any conduct, no matter how heinous. In making this point regarding the relativistic nature of values clarification, DiGiacomo (1989, 37) writes:
Thieves cannot be condemned for stealing, nor murderers for murdering, nor rapists for rape, etc., because from their point of view the conduct is right. A classic example of such absurdity is the insistence of pro-abortionists on referring to themselves as "pro-choice" implying that all choices are right.
One education critic, who is also a university professor, claims that every one of the first-year students who enters his university class is a moral relativist. Their belief is that all values are relative and that one person's values are just as good as another's (cited in Murphy 1993, 3). It is a fundamental presupposition in a Catholic philosophy of education that the rightness or wrongness of anything cannot ultimately rest on a particular person's ability to clarify values and to come to an individual decision. As Charlesworth (1988, 2) has stated:
Some things are true whether we think so or not; some things are good whether they suit our interest or not; some things are just whether or not they go counter to what we immediately want; some things are beautiful whether we happen to like them or not; some things are sacred whether we are willing to recognize them or not.
Other writers such as Boyd (1984, 293) argue that unqualified values clarification is just as detrimental to the development of critical thinking as is the purest form of indoctrination. He argues that by reducing all values issues to the "something" that results from one person's "choosing, prizing and acting," we "miseducate" students in a way that prevents them from "thinking" about moral questions. Boyd writes, "If one leaves critical thinking and reason giving out of the making of value claims, what one is left with is simply preferences" (p.291). The real failure of values clarification in this sense is that it trivializes values into matters of personal taste.
One does not have to look hard to see that values clarification thinking of the purest variety is still with us today in the kind of relativistic language we hear. Comments like "there are no right or wrong answers" or "you have to decide what is right for you" are still around. Such comments have far-reaching implications: "Nothing is objectively right or wrong; moral means what's right for me" (Lickona 1991, 240). As a result, there does not exist anything that can be considered a "fundamental moral truth". Theologian Greogory Baum (cited in Crawford and Rossiter 1988, 6) points out the serious limitations of such thinking:
There are no abiding values. People choose their values as they do their goods at the supermarket. Some people like this, others like that. It is all a matter of taste. There are no abiding standards beyond personal predilection, and hence there are no norms in terms of which we can judge society as whole. Relativism of this kind is ultimately cynical.
Despite the obvious pitfalls of values clarification, many scholars in the field of Catholic education would advocate the use of its processes. Among less conservative scholars, Traviss (1985, 14) has written, "Values clarification is a useful tool for helping students understand their own value system and meaning of everyday experiences". Among more conservative scholars, Buetow (1988, 116) provides a positive critique: "It must be said that the values clarification process increases awareness of the issues. It also, in many ways, improves upon traditional approaches". Even Lickona (1991, 238), a vocal critic of values clarification, has recognized some features in the strategies that are worthwhile:
Is there any value in values clarification? I believe there is. Values clarification encourages people to close the gap between espoused values and personal action. As long as the values are good ones - such as acting responsibly toward oneself and others - value-action consistency is certainly a worthwhile goal.
To suggest that values clarification processes have value for all Catholic educators is perhaps an understatement. However, the norms and guidelines provided by the Gospels and magisterial teachings are always close at hand. Values clarification in the Catholic educational sense does not exist in a vacuum.
Choosing the Best of All Approaches
For Catholic education to limit itself to either indoctrination or values clarification, especially in the extreme sense, would be to encourage fanaticism. To rely only on indoctrination would be to rob students of their right to become autonomous, free thinking human beings; conversely, to rely completely on values clarification would result in a marketplace morality that promotes shopping around for values choices that suit one's particular needs and desires regardless of their moral righteousness. A type of indoctrination that respects human dignity and calls for a free, and even critical response, coupled with a type of values clarification that does not require total permissiveness on the part of the teacher that Raths (1969) and others would insist on, is exactly the type of model that Catholic education needs to achieve. As Sullivan (1975, 101) writes:
Permissiveness is not what is needed….What is needed is a subtle combination of injecting new ideas…on the one hand; and allowing scope for members of the group to reject these ideas and to propose alternatives, on the other….What is needed is that the teacher treat students as other people, who have a diversity of abilities and desires (just as he has), and with whom he happens to be engaged in certain semipersonal cooperative activities. He has been given a degree of authority, put forward as a resource person, chairman, leader….It is in these ways, then, rather than in adopting an artificial and ineffectual "hands off" policy that the solution to the problem of indoctrination in controversial areas lies. Teachers will always exercise some influence over students, just as students will exercise influence over teachers and fellow students. This is how it must be. However, if the influence is exercised with good intentions and with due regard for general problems of evidence and proof, and if the personality of the other party is fully engaged and his individuality and autonomy [are] fully respected, any charge of indoctrination [in the pejorative sense] will be difficult to sustain.
Catholic school educators would agree with Dewey (1902, 43) when he writes, "The child's moral character must develop in a natural, just and social atmosphere. The school should provide this environment for the child's moral development". The justice that Dewey alludes to in these remarks is one of the most fundamental aspects of the Catholic school mission. This point is made by McLeod (1992, 70):
I would suggest that a commitment to justice is one distinguishing characteristic which every Catholic school and school system must possess. Without this particular distinguishing characteristic, a Catholic school or school system has no reason for existing, let alone for making claims on the public purse….I propose that social justice issues and analysis must be incorporated into the curriculum of every Catholic school.
Basic to the kind of justice that McLeod speaks about is the Catholic school's responsibility for helping students become respectful of value differences. Especially regarding people from different cultural and religious backgrounds. This view of education calls students and teachers to become involved, individually and collectively, in the ongoing struggle for justice and peace in the local, national and global sense. Added to this basic backdrop of Catholic education are various other values such as love, compassion, empathy and harmony.
Dewey (1902) also refers to the social aspect of moral education. Again, we find a close alignment with the Catholic school mission. According to the Vatican document Lay Catholics in Schools (Congregation for Catholic Education 1982),
The vocation of every Catholic educator includes the work of ongoing social development: to form men and women who will be ready to take their place in society, preparing them in such a way that they will make the kind of social commitment which will enable them to work for the improvement of social structures, making these structures more conformed to the principles of the Gospel.
As mentioned, the hard-core values clarificators would charge Catholics for indoctrinating their youth by the very fact that they hold certain values as ultimate. The basic Catholic value of social justice, while probably gaining agreement for the most part even by those who abhor indoctrination, would lose credibility if it were acquired by students in an environment that fostered, instilled or inculcated such values. These are words that Raths (1969) and Simon (1974) would take great exception to. Well-known moral educator, Lawrence Kohlberg also concurs with this line of thinking. In Hennessy's 1978 interview with Kohlberg for The Catholic World, Hennessy was astonished to discover that Kohlberg "seems to have different feelings about indoctrination within a community of commonly shared values because the pluralism is not as broad".
Despite the fact that indoctrination is not totally dismissed in the Catholic school, it is also recognized that a values education that relies exclusively on this technique (especially in the way it has been traditionally viewed) would be lacking in vigor, as well as student interest and involvement. Passivity on the part of students is always detrimental to their cognitive and affective development, no matter what type of school we are talking about. Perhaps DiGiancomo (1989, 37) says it best:
Although one of the duties of religious educators is to tell their students, in a forthright manner, that some things are right and some things are wrong, moral instruction has to go much further than that. It must help young people to develop their own ability to analyze moral issues, perceive the values at stake, and make responsible judgements and decisions.
Even though these are words of a Catholic Jesuit priest, it is not difficult to draw a direct parallel with many of the "clarifying strategies" advocated by Raths (1969). The fundamental difference between Raths and diGiacomo is that the latter would neither encourage nor tolerate total permissiveness on the part of the teacher. It can be logically inferred from DiGiacomo's comments that thinking skills, many of which can be developed through the processes of values clarification, are an important aspect of values education in a Catholic school. However, the Catholic school mission is not be obscured.
Hall's (1973) modification of Raths' critieria of values clarification has been one of the more positive developments in moral education. While appreciating much of what is contained in the seven-point definition, Hall argues that it is sometimes destructive to emphasize that one has to feel immediately happy about having chosen a particular value:
A painful situation that may make a person feel unhappy in the short run, may also be more productive in the long run. Therefore, I think it needs to be said that in addition to being happy about my value choice, it has to be a choice that involves the creative development rather than the destructive development of the personality (p.66).
Hall appropriately adds an eighth point to Raths' definition that the values must "enhance and not impede the development of my emotional and spiritual well being". The added emphasis on the spiritual is also a welcome modification from a Catholic standpoint.
Also from a Catholic educational perspective, Raths' criteria could be greatly improved by adding a ninth dimension that considers how a particular value choice will affect others. There seems to be a strong emphasis in Raths' definition on "I" as opposed to the welfare of "others". What is lacking is a strong affirmation of what should be considered a primary value - our responsibility to reach out and affirm other people as being of value. While one might argue that Raths covers this point when he speaks of consequences, it has been argued that the consequences he considers are only those that affect the values clarificator. We must not forget that it is entirely possible for someone to cherish, and be happy with a value that has a destructive influence on others.
The Catholic Advantage
Catholic education has long recognized the sources of values as being threefold - God, neighbor and self (Buetow 1988, 114) - and, as such, would recognize the flaws to be found in any system that favors one aspect to the exclusion of others. Ignoring God and neighbor as sources of values results in what Gleeson (1990, 11, 112) calls:
the pursuit of self as the new wisdom….It is time we ended the cult of self. With the glorification of independence and personal choice in our society, the self has become a God, and the message is offered that there is no point to life other than the pursuit of self.
While the self has a role as a source of values, it must not be viewed as the source of all truth. Values clarification strategies that include God and neighbor do have a place in Catholic schools and must not be left to chance.
While it may seem like a paradox, I also feel that we need to look critically, as it were, on the whole question of "critical thinking". As an educator, I wholeheartedly support pedagogy that causes students to reflect, appraise, evaluate and be critical of those ideas presented to them; however, even these things need to be done in a manner recognizing certain "yardsticks". This kind of thinking is indeed replacing that of pure values clarification, as has been evidenced by the writings of such people as Kirman (1991, 27): "Children need a yardstick to measure the worth of any future values. It is in social studies [and also in religious education] that such a yardstick can be developed". Statements like this now challenge educators to ask questions, such as "Would we be satisfied to produce students who can think critically about a value such as honesty, but nevertheless choose in their own lives, to lie, cheat, and steal"? (Lickona 1991, 38). The problem that occurred with the purest form of values clarification was that no distinction was made between what one might "want to do" (such as shoplift) and what one "ought to do" (such as respect the property and rights of others) (Lickona, 1991, 11). Lickona goes on to write that "there was no requirement to evaluate one's values against a standard, no suggestion that some values might be better or worse than others….There's a big problem with any approach that doesn't distinguish between Mother Teresa and the Happy Hooker" (Lickona, 1991, 11)).
Catholic education, unapologetically, does make this distinction based on our obligation not only to ourselves but also to others. To illustrate those specific values we hold as primary and which reflect this philosophy would result in long lists of examples beyond the scope of this article. However, some are provided by Church documents which point to certain patterns, among them:
a freedom which includes respect for others; conscientious responsibility; a sincere and constant search for truth; a calm and peaceful critical spirit; a spirit of solidarity with and service toward all other persons; a sensitivity for "justice"; a special awareness of being called to be positive agents of change in a society that is undergoing continuous transformation (Congregation for Catholic Education, 1982).
Because these values must affect how we live, values education in Catholic schools must not allow for a false dichotomy between knowledge and virtue. Catholic values must look for outcomes in science, math and social studies that recognize that there is a way to know all these disciplines, which gives primacy always to the wonder, dignity and the rights of each person. As Murphy (1993, 2) wrote: "There should be no gulf between the heart and the head as if one can know all of the great and worthwhile values of human life and yet live a life in opposition to them. Catholic education will always relate the action of knowing and learning to the act of loving". Perhaps the best example of knowing without loving can be found in the words of a principal from a large, inner-city school in Boston who every year sends the following letter to all his new teachers:
Dear teacher, I am the victim of a concentration camp. My eyes saw what no man should witness: gas chambers built by learned engineers; children poisoned by educated physicians; infants killed by trained nurses; women and babies shot and burned by high school and college graduates. So I am suspicious of education (cited in Murphy 1993, 2).
Catholic schools can provide the leadership in eliminating the suspicious attitudes that center around education by instilling the value that all creation is a gift, and that all persons need to strive to show care, compassion, empathy and love for their fellow humans. As such, these values comprise what might be called the Catholic advantage. My only wish is that this Catholic advantage could become the advantage of all education. By recognizing that certain values are primary or absolute, and by modifying values clarification theory, we will be able to achieve Harmin's (1988) goal of going for both "value clarity and high morality".
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